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 CLD-216       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3932 
___________ 
  
RAYMOND BROWN, 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
F. BUCK, JR., #1413; T. FITZPATRICK, #4337; R. CRAWFORD, #1768; J. POTTS, 
#4315; A. FRASER, #8666; S. BENNIS, #0117 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-14-cv-02866) 
District Judge:  Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Junior 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 28, 2015 
 
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  June 12, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Raymond Brown, an inmate, appeals the District Court’s orders dismissing his 
civil rights lawsuit and denying his motions for reconsideration.  We will affirm. 
 On May 19, 2014, Brown filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that police 
officers used excessive force against him in March of 2011.  Specifically, Brown alleged 
that immediately after he shot himself in the chest in an attempted suicide, a SWAT 
officer shot him in the head.  Accompanying the complaint, Brown filed a “motion for 
request to file complaint late,” in which he argued that the District Court should treat his 
complaint as timely filed in light of his mental illness resulting from his injuries.  The 
District Court issued an order dismissing Brown’s complaint as time-barred by the statute 
of limitations and denying his motion “for request to file complaint late.”   
 Brown then filed a “motion for time extension for filing,” in which he argued that 
that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because his injuries left him 
hospitalized; he had to relearn how to eat, walk, and talk; and during this time, he was 
found incompetent to stand trial in his criminal case and was ordered to complete a 360-
day “mental and medical treatment.”  The District Court denied Brown’s motion, finding 
that he filed a different civil action in district court in September of 2012, which belied 
his claim that a medical or mental condition hindered his ability to file the current 
lawsuit.   
 Brown then filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the District Court 
should equitably toll the statute of limitations because the defendants attempted to 
conceal the facts surrounding his claim, and that he was not aware of all the 
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circumstances surrounding his lawsuit until the conclusion of his criminal trial for 
attempted murder of the officers, at which the evidence showed that Brown posed no 
threat to them.  In addition, Brown argued that his criminal attorney advised him that he 
could not file a civil suit until that case was complete.  The District Court denied Brown’s 
motion. 
 Brown timely filed a notice of appeal, in which he stated his intent to appeal only 
the District Court’s order denying his motion for time extension for filing.1  Nevertheless, 
this Court has jurisdiction over any order not specified in the notice of appeal “if (1) there 
is a connection between the specified and unspecified orders; (2) the intention to appeal 
the unspecified order is apparent; and (3) the opposing party is not prejudiced and has a 
full opportunity to brief the issues.”  Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 
184 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).  It is “reasonably clear” that Brown 
intended to appeal the District Court’s order dismissing his suit, as well as the District 
Court’s orders denying his motion for reconsideration.  See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. 
Mills, 634 F.3d 746, 751-52 (3d Cir. 2011).  Accordingly, we will review both the 
District Court’s judgment and its denial of Brown’s motions for reconsideration.  We 
have jurisdiction over Brown’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal 
presents no substantial questions.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
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 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing the 
complaint.  See Allah, 229 F.3d at 223.  Moreover, we characterize Brown’s “motion for 
extension of time for filing” as a timely-filed motion for reconsideration of the District 
Court’s judgment, see Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e), and we review the denial 
thereof for an abuse of discretion.  N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 
1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995).  We likewise review the denial of the subsequent motion for 
reconsideration for an abuse of discretion.  Id.  
 When screening a complaint under section 1915, a district court may sua sponte 
dismiss the complaint as untimely under the statute of limitations where the defense is 
obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required.  See 
Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir.2006); Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 
F.3d 648, 656-57 (4th Cir.2006); Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th 
Cir.2001); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1995).  As the District Court correctly 
ruled, Brown’s complaint was barred by the statute of limitations.  For section 1983 
actions based on conduct in Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations is two years from the 
date the claim accrued.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 
634 (3d Cir. 2009).  A claim accrues “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of 
the injury upon which [his] action is based.”  Kach, 589 F.3d at 634 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Brown alleged that the officers used excessive force against him when 
                                                                                                                                                  
1 Because the District Court’s order dismissing Brown’s complaint was not set out in a 
separate document, his notice of appeal is timely as to that order.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58; 
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they shot him on March 22, 2011, and his claim accrued then.  Brown’s complaint, which 
he filed over three years later, is thus untimely.   
 Furthermore, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to 
deny Brown’s motions for reconsideration.  Brown argued that he was entitled to 
equitable tolling.  Equitable tolling is extraordinary relief, and is appropriate only when:  
(1) a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff regarding his or her cause of action; (2) a 
plaintiff has been prevented from asserting a claim as a result of other extraordinary 
circumstances; or (3) a plaintiff has timely asserted his or her claim in the wrong forum.  
Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 370 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000).  Brown argued that he was entitled 
to equitable tolling because the defendants caused injuries that left him mentally and 
physically incapacitated, which hindered his ability to file this suit.  But as the District 
Court found, notwithstanding these injuries, Brown pro se filed a different law suit in 
district court in September of 2012.  None of Brown’s filings explain why he could not 
have filed this lawsuit then—well before the statute of limitations expired.    
 Brown also argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled because the 
defendants fraudulently concealed the circumstances surrounding his injury.  More 
specifically, Brown claimed that the police officers falsely reported that they shot him in 
self-defense.  Under Pennsylvania’s fraudulent concealment doctrine, the statute of 
limitations is tolled where the defendant undertakes an “affirmative and independent act 
of concealment that would prevent the plaintiff from discovering the injury despite the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Local Union No. 1992, IBEW v. Okonite Co., 358 F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2004).     
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exercise of reasonable diligence.”  Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 926 (3d. Cir. 1991).  
Fraudulent concealment does not render the statute of limitations inoperable.  Instead, 
where the defendant fraudulently conceals the plaintiff’s injury, “[the statute of 
limitations] begins to run as soon as the plaintiff, exercising reasonable diligence, knew 
or should have known of the injury and its cause.”  Id.  Even assuming, as Brown 
suggests, the officers falsely reported they shot Brown in self-defense, those statements 
do not conceal Brown’s injury or its cause.  Rather, Brown knew of his injury the 
moment the SWAT officer shot him.  Brown’s reliance on the doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment is thus misplaced.      
   Furthermore, even assuming Brown’s criminal counsel advised him that he could 
not file a civil suit until the criminal case closed, Brown has alleged no grounds for 
tolling under the discovery rule.  The discovery rule applies in cases where the injured 
party is unable to know that he is injured and to know what caused the injury, despite the 
exercise of reasonable diligence.  Id.  However, the standard of reasonable diligence is an 
objective one and turns on the nature of the injury and whether it is latent, and does not 
turn on any specific characteristics unique to the plaintiff that might otherwise prevent 
him from recognizing his injury as a cause of action.  See Lake, 232 F.3d at 367.  
Brown’s alleged injuries and the causes thereof were immediately ascertainable, and thus 
he could have timely brought this lawsuit before the conclusion of his criminal case.  Any 
alleged advice to the contrary does not toll the running of the statute of limitations.  See 
Hunsicker v. Connor, 465 A.2d 24, 27 (Pa. 1983) (“Even if non-negligent, we do not find 
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counsel’s failure or inability to pursue a plaintiff’s cause of action a sufficient reason” to 
toll the statute of limitations).  In sum, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the District 
Court’s decision to deny Brown’s motions for reconsideration. 
 Because this appeal presents us with no substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See 3rd Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  We 
also deny Brown’s request for appointment for counsel on appeal as his appeal lacks any 
arguable merit. 
